Land & Water Law Review
Volume 2

Issue 2

Article 5

1967

Mining - The Marketability Test and the Prudent Man Test Building Stone as a Comman Variety Mineral - Coleman v. United
States
Donald K. Roberts

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water

Recommended Citation
Roberts, Donald K. (1967) "Mining - The Marketability Test and the Prudent Man Test - Building Stone as a
Comman Variety Mineral - Coleman v. United States," Land & Water Law Review: Vol. 2 : Iss. 2 , pp. 365 375.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol2/iss2/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Land & Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship.

Roberts: Mining - The Marketability Test and the Prudent Man Test - Buildi

CASE NOTE
MINING-The Marketability Test and the Prudent Man test-building stone as
a comman variety mineral. Coleman v. United States, 363 F.2d
190 (9th Cir. 1966).

In a suit brought by the United States for ejectment of
Coleman from his mining claims, the District Court entered summary judgment for the United States and dismissed
Coleman's counterclaim to review the decision of the Interior
Department.' Coleman had located several mining claims for
building stone in a national forest and for nearly ten years
had developed them. During this period his improvements
were valued at $17,200 which included a home and he had produced $15,900 worth of building stone most of which he sold.
When Coleman applied for a patent for the claims it was denied on the ground that Coleman had not satisfied all the
requirements for discovery of a valuable mineral deposit including a showing that the material could be extracted, removed, and marketed at a profit.2 The Interior Department
also ruled that since the area surrounding Coleman's claims
contained the same type quartzite, the stone must be considered a "common variety" under the Surface Resources Act
of 1955.' Upon appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that since building stone is specifically excluded from
the Surface Resources Act due to section 161 of the mederal
mining law,4 the prudent man test applies as in other mining
1. It is significant that the court felt that Coleman's counterclaim to the
ejectment suit was an appropriate method for judicial review of the agency
action rather than requiring him to directly appeal for review of the
agency action. The court refused to recognize the distinction argued by
the government that this was a collateral attack upon final agency rather
than a direct review thereof, and therefore judicial surveillance would be
under a more restrictive standard.
This allows the claimant to choose his court in such proceedings because
he can wait for the government to file an ejeetment action and then have
the case heard in his domicile. The 1962 amendments to the federal venue
statute [28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1964)] accomplish the same result and the
reader is referred to Sperling & Cooney, JudicialReview of Administrative
Decisions Under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 1 LAND & WATER L. REV.
423 (1966), for an extended discussion concerning the judicial review of
administrative decisions by the Department of Interior.
In this connection the United States has filed a petition for rehearing
with the Ninth Circuit, and the court has requested Coleman to reply "with
special attention to the question of whether the Secretary of Interior is an
indispensable party to the counterclaim" filed by Coleman's attorney in
the trial court. GowER, 1966 FEDERAL SERVICF-MINING, Newsletters Oct. 10,
at 2.
2. United States v. Coleman, A-28557 (1962), affirming in part and reversing
in part, Contest No. 6833 (Mining) Los Angeles No. 0137951. GowEaR, 1962
FEDERAL SERVICE-MINING, Solicitor's Opinion No. 4.
3. 69 Stat. 368 (1955), 30 U.S.C. § 611 (1964).
4. 27 Stat. 348 (1892), 30 U.S.C. § 161 (1964).
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claims and the requirement of present market-ability is relevant only with respect to the issue of claimant's good faith.'
A discovery of a valuable mineral deposit must be made
under federal mining law in order to validate a claim.' The
standard to determine the existence of a discovery is the prudent man test, first stated by the Interior Department in
Castle v. Womble:7
[W] here minerals have been found and the evidence
is of such a character that a person of ordinary prudence would be justified in the further expenditure
of his labor and means, with a reasonable prospect of
success, in developing a valuable mine, the requirements of the statute have been met.8
The valuable mineral in the Castle case was gold and the prudent man test provided a workable standard for similar intrinsically valuable minerals of limited occurrence. Difficulty arose however when the prudent man criteria was applied to nonmetallic minerals of widespread occurrence such
as sand and gravel and, to a lesser degree, low grade metallic
mineral deposits.
Consequently, in 1929, the marketability requirement was
introduced by the Interior Department in Layman v. Ellis,9
which held that sand and gravel were locatable minerals under federal mining law. This opinion quoted from Lindley on
Mines, section 98, which offered the marketability requirement as an alternative to the prudent man test depending
upon the type of mineral deposit being examined.
In the second Layman v. Ellis decision" which affirmed
the first ruling, the solicitor stated that the marketability or
profitability test must be used by the claimant to justify his
claim:
[T]he mineral locator or applicant, to justify his
possession, must show that by reason of accessibility,
bona fides in development, proximity to market, existence of present demand, and other factors, the de&
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Coleman v. United States, 363 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1966).
RE V. STAT. § 2319 (1875), 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1964).
19 Interior Dec. 455 (1894).
Id. at 457.
52 Interior Dec. 714 (1929).
54 Interior Dec. 294 (1933).
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posit is of such value that it can be mined, removed
and disposed of at a profit.1
In 1959, this concept was given judicial approval in Foster v. Seaton, 12 which affirmed an Interior Department ruling that refused to allow mining claims to be filed for sand
and gravel deposits in the Las Vegas, Nevada area. The court
in Foster recognized the prudent man test, but limited its
application to minerals of limited occurrence. With respect to
widespread nonmetallic minerals the court quoted with approval the statement of the solicitor in Layman v. Ellis 3 and
made the marketability test a requirement that had to be met
before a valid claim could be obtained for a nonmetallic mineral of widespread occurrence. This concept was justified as
a means to prevent the public domain from being misappropriated under the mining law for purposes other than mining.
An important aspect of Coleman and related cases discussed in detail below is the meaning of marketability as
used by the Interior Department and the courts. The Interior
Department issued Solicitor's Opinion M-36642" in 1962
in an attempt to clarify the Department's position.
The Department and the courts have, we believe,
rightly held that a prudent man would not be justified in developing a mineral deposit if the extracted
minerals were not marketable. This marketability
test is in reality applied to all minerals, although it
is often mistakenly said to be applied solely to nonmetallic minerals of wide occurrence. Many minerals
are deemed intrinsically valuable.
An intrinsically valuable mineral by its very nature is deemed marketable, and therefore merely
showing the nature of the mineral usually meets the
test of marketability. On the other hand, where we
are concerned with a nonmetallic mineral found in
a great many places, application of the prudent man
man test requires that a market for the mineral be
shown by the locator. The extreme example is probably sand and gravel, which are found in every
State.'"
Id. at 296.
271 F. 2d 836 (D. C. Cir. 1959).
54 Interior Dec. 294 (1933).
M-36642 Review of the "Marketability Rule" as Applied to the Law of
Discovery, 69 Interior Dec. 145 (1962).
15. Id. at 146.
11.
12.
13.
14.
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It may then be possible to categorize the marketability
test as applied by the Interior Department as follows:
(1)

If the mineral has intrinsic value, it will by its nature be considered marketable.

(2)

However, as the cases show, there may be low grade
deposits of intrinsically valuable minerals, where,
although a market exists for the mineral, generally there is no prospect of producing the particular
deposit at a profit, and thus marketability in this
context is related to profitability.

(3)

In nonmetallic mineral deposits of limited occurrence, the solicitor's opinion infers that the marketability requirement, as part of the prudent man
test, is satisfied if the claimant can show the existence of a market.

(4)

In nonmetallic mineral deposits of widespread occurrence, the marketability test requires the claimant to show both a market and that his particular
deposit can be marketed at a profit considering
the various costs, including mining, processing, its
proximity to the market, and transportation involved in the operation.

The cases below illustrate the difficulty courts have had
in placing a particular fact situation in a specific category
with the result that confusion exists as to the distinction between marketability and profitability.
Adams v. United States," decided by the Ninth Circuit
in 1963, concerned gold mining claims in California. Adams
had filed the claims in 1929 and had sporadically worked them
until 1937. When the hearing to determine the validity of the
claims was held in 1954, the claims were declared null and
void by the Interior Department and this was upheld by the
court. The Department concluded that Adams did not show
that enough gold remained on the claims in 1954 to justify
a prudent man in expending his time and money in developing the claim. The marketability test, meaning in this context prospective profitability, was raised by the Interior De16. 318 F.2d 861, 870 (9th Cir. 1963).
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partment and evidence was offered to show that the cost of
extracting what little gold was left would preclude a profitable
operation. The court said that this evidence was acceptable
when treated in its proper context as part of the consideration
to be made to determine if a prudent man would undertake
the venture.
Mulkern v. Hanmitt,17 decided by the same court in 1964,
affirmed a Nevada District Court decision that refused to
enjoin the cancellation of certain placer mining claims for
gypsum and sanfd. These claims dated back to 1922 and had
never been exploited. A collateral fact here was that the area
involved had been made part of a National Wildlife Reserve
in 1926 which withdrew the area after that date from mineral
exploration. The court affirmed the order cancelling the
claims and gave approval to the evidence offered by the Interior Department that at the time of the hearing in 1957, "the
nature of the minerals, the cost of extracting and transporting
them, the extent of the market and its distance from the
land were such that 'a prudent man would not be warranted in
expending his time and money on the claims.'

"8 Here mar-

ketability again relates to profitability.
Denison v. Udall" was a review of an Interior Department ruling denying patents to manganese mining claims.
The hearings were held in 1963 and involved claims that did
contain low grade manganese."0 All sales from the claims
were made during World War II and thereafter, but, prior
to 1959, when the government stopped buying manganese in
carload lots. From that date on domestic manganese could
not compete with foreign imports and the price fell from $90
to $40-$50 per ton. The solicitor ruled that the claimant had
not sustained the burden of showing a market for the ore and
therefore denied the patents.
Upon appeal to the District Court of Arizona, the solicitor's opinion was reversed and the case remanded to the
Interior Department for futher evidentiary proceedings. The
court stated, relying on Foster v. Seaton,21 that the present
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

326 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1964).
Id. at 897.
248 F. Supp. 942 (D.C. Ariz. 1965).
United States v. Denison, 71 Interior Dec. 144 (1964).
271 F.2d 836 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
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marketability test did not apply to metallic minerals such
as manganese. Moreover, even if the standard did apply, the
government failed by its evidence to show that the expectation
of a future market was so remote that a prudent man would
not expend money in developing the claims. In other words,
the court strongly infers that when the marketability test is
raised in the context of future profitability, the burden of
proof is on the Interior Department to show that a prudent
man would not be justified in developing the claims. Thus
Denison must be considered as a departure from both Layman
v. Ellis2" and Foster v. Seaton2 so far as who must raise the
issue and who must prove the marketability test. Denison may
be distinguishable from the other two cases since manganese
is a valuable mineral and the critical point of the government's
contention was that this particular deposit could not be mined,
processed, and marketed at a profit at the present market
price. As will be developed later, the court in Coleman reaches
the same conclusion pertaining to the burden of proof as did
the court in Denison, but by a different route.
While the court in Coleman was concerned with and 'discussed in detail the marketability requirement for mining
claims as imposed by the Interior Department, the decision
was also based on statutory interpretation 'due to the type of
mineral in question, building stone. Congress, in 1892, enacted the Building Stone Act which authorized persons to
enter the public lands under the mining laws of the United
States and file placer mineral claims for building stone. 2 '
In 1955, Congress recognized that the mining laws were
being abused and were being used to gain entry to and tie
up the public domain for purposes other than mining. This
led to the enactment of Surface Resources Act under which:
No deposit of common varieties of san'd, stone, gravel pumice, pumicite, or cinders and no "depositof petrified wood shall be deemed a valuable mineral deposit within the meaning of the mining laws of the Uniter States so as to give effective validity to any mining claim hereafter located under such mining laws:
. . . "Common varieties" . . . does not include de22. 54 Interior Dec. 294 (1933).
23. 271 F.2d 836 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
24. 27 Stat. 848 (1892), 30 U.S.C. § 161 (1964).
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posits of such materials which are valuable because
the 'deposit has some property giving it distinct and
special value ... 25
The court in Coleman refused to include building stone
under the Surface Resources Act because section 161 was not
expressly repealed by section 611 and therefore the latter
section had no application in the case. However, even without section 161, the court implied that building stone would
come under the exception clause of section 611 since building stone is by its very nature not a common variety of stone,
and would be locatable because of its distinct properties giving it special value.
This would appear to be contrary to the general classification used by the Interior Department. In Coleman, under
the court's approach, stone was used as the common variety
and building stone was an exception to the common variety
and therefore locatable. If the court had decided building
stone was the general classification, the building stone belonging to Coleman would not in all probability have been
excluded as an uncommon variety. The latter system of classification seems to have been the method adopted by the Interior Department as evidenced in United States v. Henderson."G
In that case the claimant had located sand and gravel deposits
of superior quality for use in construction work. Moreover,
due to the unique colors of the material, it was suitable for
use as a "poor man's terrazzo," and had in fact been used as
a facing on some buildings in the area. The Interior Department acknowledged these facts and then held against the
claimant since the deposit was going to be used for the same
purposes as other less unique deposits that were widely and
readily available. Had the court in Coleman used the same reasoning the decision would have been for the Interior Department.
By placing special emhpasis on the exception clause of
the Surface Resources Act it appears the court in Coleman
believed that the primary purpose of the act was not to exclude the named minerals from being claimed under mining
law, but was to prevent claims from being filed to gain con25. 69 Stat. 368 (1955), 30 U.S.C. § 611 (1964)
26. 68 Interior Dec. 26 (1961).

(Emphasis supplied).
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trol of federal land for purposes other than mining. Consequently, if the potential claimant can show some reason for
including the deposit under the exception clause of the act,
he should be allowed to file his claim if he can satisfy the requirements of the prudent man test.
Interwoven with the problems of statutory interpretation in Coleman is the more important and more far reaching
problem of the marketability requirement in federal mining
law. As discussed previously, marketability as used both by the
Interior Department and the courts often includes the various
factors that relate to profitability of the operation and hence
the words are sometimes used interchangeably. The Coleman
court rejected the interpretation of Fosterv. Seaton" made by
the Interior Department that imposed upon the claimant of
minerals of widespread occurrence the necessity of showing
the ability to market the mineral at a profit. The reasoning
of the court was that there is nothing in the general mining
law which justifies separate rules for minerals of widepsread
occurrence and those of more limited occurrence. Moreover,
the purpose of the marketability test is to prevent the misappropriation of public lands through the mining laws for
purposes other than mining. This purpose can be achieved,
the court felt, by adherence to the prudent man test of Castle
v. Womble.2" This test should suffice for any type of mineral
deposit be it metallic, nonmetallic, widespread, or limited, and
there is no reason to establish different standards for placer
'claims for gold bearing sands and placer claims for building
stone.
Inherent in the prudent man test is the good faith of
the applicant and this is the proper context, according to the
court, in which to apply the marketability test as set forth
in Foster v. Seaton. Consequently, the court in Coleman relegated the marketability requirement to the position of being part of the evidence that can be introduced if the good
faith of the claimant is challenged under the prudent man
test.
The court chastised the Interior Department for attempting to convert one aspect of the relevant evidence into an ab27. 271 F.2d 836 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
28. 19 Interior Dec. 455 (1894).
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solute legal requirement and thereby imposing a different
standard for different types of mineral claims. Using these
guidelines the Coleman court felt that the marketability test
had been properly applied in both the Adams and Mulkern
cases and saw no inconsistency with their present decision.
Coleman, thus, stands for the proposition that marketability or assurance of profitability is an element to be considered in determining if the good faith of the claimant is
an issue in deciding whether or not the requirements of the
prudent man test have been satisfied. Moreover, if good faith
is to be made an issue, it must be raised by the government.
In some fact situations such as Adams and Mulkern, marketability may become a large or even the dominant factor, but
it is not an absolute requirement in all cases.
There are several practical implications in the Coleman
decision. First of all, by limiting the concept of common varieties under Surface Resources Act, and expanding the importance of the exception clauses of that act, it may be possible
to file claims under the mining law for at least some subclassifications of the materials mentioned in the act if the
applicant can show that his deposit has a distinct property
having special value. The extent to which this will be carried
remains to be seen. For example, there are several marble
deposits in Wyoming and surrounding states. If, as under
Coleman, the common variety is considered to be stone, then
marble would be considered an uncommon variety of stone and
thus locatable. On the other hand, if marble is considered as
the common variety, as the Interior Department contends, a
particular deposit of marble would have to satisfy the requirements pertaining to distinct properties and uses as set
forth in the following Interior Department regulation:
Mineral materials which occur commonly shall not
be deemed to be "common varieties" if a particular
deposit has distinct and special properties making
it commercially valuable for use in a manufacturing, industrial, or processing operation. In the determination of commercial value, such factors may
be considered as quality and quantity of the deposit,
geographical location, proximity to market or point
of utilization, accessibility to transportation, requirements for reasonable reserves consistent with usual
industry practices to serve existing or proposed manPublished by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1967
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ufacturing, industrial, or processing facilities, and
feasible methods of mining and removel of the material."
Although it can be contended that these regulations would
suffice to allow some marble deposits to be claimed, the result of Coleman is that the claimant need no longer show that
his particular marble deposit has a distinctive property that
removes it from the common variety classification, since all
marble is an uncommon variety of stone.
Coleman obviously excludes building stone from the Surface Resources Act and the question left unanswered is the
line of demarcation between common varieties of stone and
building stone. Apparently any stone, that can be cut in
blocks and can be used to face a building, will be considered
building stone.
Coleman also severely limits the use that the Interior
Department can make of the marketability test, at least in
the Ninth Circuit. Even though the court in Coleman felt it
had reconciled this decision with Foster v. Seaton, there are
still discrepancies concerning the importance of the marketability test between the Ninth Circuit and the District of
Columbia Circuit which decided Foster.
The prudent man test again becomes the key and the
marketability test important only as a part of the overall
good faith of the claimant. When properly applied this should
not be a serious detriment to the Interior Department in administering the public lands since it should be able to prevent misappropriation of public lands for purposes other
than mining by strict adherence to the prudent man test.
The Interior Department can still rely on the Surface
Resources Act as it applies to the minerals named therein,
even though the exception clause of the act has gained new importance.
Moreover, Coleman could lead to the 'development of
some low grade mineral deposits on the public lands. For example, there are many low grade uranium deposits in Wyoming and the Four Corners area. Under current conditions,
29. 43 C.F.R. § 3511.1(b)

(Rev. 1965).
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these deposits cannot be exploited at a profit due to the existing market price of uranium concentrate. Therefore, by a
strict application of the marketability test, as set forth by
the Interior Department, these deposits would not be locatable.
However, there are many "prudent" men who believe
that in the immediate future the private, as contrasted with
government, demand for uranium will exceed the present supply thus increasing the price and making the present marginal deposits commercial.
Coupled with this are the rapid technological advances
being made in mining and process metallurgy. Even without
an increase in market price of the mineral these advances
show some promise of making commercial many deposits that
are presently noncommercial. Using Coleman as a guide these
low grade deposits should be locatable. This should serve as
a further stimulant to private industry to develop more sophisticated technology since, by already having the deposit
claimed, there will be a more direct relationship between research and possible application of this research in field operations and the ultimate receipt of a profit. Under the guidelines established by the Interior Department whereby marketability or profitability was a prerequisite to locate or patent
a mineral claim, many concerns would have little interest in
low grade 'deposits. This is especially true of medium and
small companies who cannot support expensive research that
may develop a new process and then not have any place or
any claim upon which to apply it.
DONALD K. ROBERTS
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